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As the title of this introduction implies, there are few traces of hope and optimism to be
found in Haiti’s current situation. If the unavoidable problems of rural communities in a nation
of peasants such as Haiti are left unaddressed, and if the nation continues to rely on the standards
of the old police state as a model for the new national police, Haiti’s transition toward democracy
will be off to a bad start. There must be the immediate desire to straighten out this tangled web if
Haiti is not to miss this window of opportunity. This Article analyzes this transition, charting the
narrow path to democracy and development from which Haiti may still benefit.
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INTRODUCTION: FIVE LANDMARKS FOR ORIENTING
THE DISCUSSION
I. THE SITUATION
I begin this article with a political anecdote about the transi-
tion to democracy in Haiti. It is the story of someone who
throws himself from the top of the only skyscraper in Port-au-
Prince and who is heard to say as he passes each floor, "so far, so
good." While it is true that Haiti's transition to democracy seems
to have progressed well until now, October 5, 1996, the question
remains: how long can such progress continue?
On July 28, 1915, the U.S. Marines landed in Haiti and be-
gan an occupation of the Caribbean nation that would last
nineteen years.' Through this occupation, the United States
would force Haiti into the twentieth century's pattern of systemic
centralization. The occupation left Haiti to furnish the United
States' sugar plantations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic
with labor, and it erected the Haitian military-police state system
that would assure the stability of the Pax Americana. The occupa-
tion would also put an end to the nineteenth century Federation
of Provinces2 which had lingered through the death throes of
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On September 19, 1994, the U.S. Marines again landed in
Haiti, this time ending the centralized military state and decen-
tralized police system that had been the hallmarks of the island's
politics since 1915, and ushering in the current, more fashiona-
ble, period of "Democratic Transition." The previous era of Hai-
tian politics had endured for eighty years. We are able to date
the beginning and end of the historical periods by the abrupt
intervention of armed force: July 28, 1915 and September 19,
1994. So far, so good. But what power can meet the dangers that
are now threatening to crush this process of democratic transi-
tion?
The two questions postulated above define the boundaries
of the position taken throughout this Article. As the title of this
introduction implies, there are few traces of hope and optimism
to be found in Haiti's current situation. If the unavoidable
problems of rural communities in a nation of peasants such as
Haiti are left unaddressed, and if the nation continues to rely on
the standards of the old police state as a model for the new na-
tional police, Haiti's transition toward democracy will be off to a
bad start. There must be the immediate desire to straighten out
this tangled web if Haiti is not to miss this window of opportu-
nity. This Article analyzes this transition, charting the narrow
path to democracy and development from which Haiti may still
benefit.'
3. This situation raises a question about the connection between the two landings
of U.S. Marines. Both landings took place when the dominant structures of Haiti were
in transition. From regionalization to centralization at the beginning of the century
(i.e., from micro to macro levels of political concentration), and from centralization to
polycentralism at the end of the century (i.e., from the macro level to what seems to be
the micro level of political concentration, which is the indispensable foundation of de-
mocracy). Direct usurpation of control and the subsequent rise of one of the prov-
inces, Port-au-Prince, over all of the others, subverted the dominant structure of nine-
teenth century regionalization that had transformed Haiti into a federation of eleven
relatively autonomous provinces. This new structure came at the expense of all that was
outside of Port-au-Prince, most notably the provincial oligarchies that had previously
been able to raise large peasant armies. This centralization eroded in the 1980s due to
the detachment of the capital Port au Prince from the rest of the country as a sort of
new urban republic. This process had the effect of returning to the provinces some of
the autonomy that they had lost at the turn of the century, giving to the shantytowns
political status equivalent to that of urban and rural areas, targeting of the locality as
the new basis of political activity, the basis, in particular, of democratization with its
attendant focus on local electoral representation. It is no coincidence that the tutor
always intervenes at the moment of transition from one structure to another in order to
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A. From the Haitian Case to the General Theory of Transitions
In the ten years from 1986 to 1996, the decade that began
with the end of the thirty-year Duvalier dictatorship,4 democratic
transitions have been the subject of a vast number of publica-
tions.' The rules and dangers of democratic transition have be-
come one of the most important questions of our time, espe-
cially in the Americas. To do justice to Haiti's status as a test case
in this global era of democratic transition, my analysis of the last
ten years will look to recent trends, with an eye toward ex-
panding the general theory of transitions to democracy. It will
not be a question of chronicling Haiti's transition process or,
even less, of making political statements, but rather of problema-
tizing frames of reference and reproblematizing the principal
ensure that the "proper" path is taken. One non-anecdotal explanation for the differ-
ent reception received by the U.S. Marines from the Haitian people, who fought inter-
vention in 1915 and welcomed it in 1994, is that at the start of the century, centraliza-
tion would prove more oppressive of the peasantry than regionalization, while at the
end of the century, the emergence of the locality as a center of political life opened
opportunities for civilian participation and liberty. See GEORGES ANGLADE, SUR LA PER-
TINANCE DE L'ECHELLE DE LA REGIONALIZATION, LE GAS DE HAh-I (discussing situation at
start of century); GEORGES ANGLADE, POUR UNE REARTICULATION DE LA GEOGRAPHY
SOCIALE DANS LE TIERS MONDE: REFLEXIONS POUR UNE RECHERCHE (discussing situation at
the end of century).
4. Jean-Claude Duvalier's government fell on February 7, 1986. DOMINICAN RE-
PUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES supra note 1, at 325.
5. One unmistakable indicator of the importance which social scientists ascribe to
a particular issue at a given time is the inventory of monographs and anthologies that
university presses devote the issue. Each of the publishers has released numerous
volumes on the transition to democracy. This abundance of academic works on the
subject has been evident for the last ten years, 1986-1996, the period under scrutiny in
this article. See TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
(Guillermo O'Donnell, et al., eds., 1986); AUTHORITARIANS AND DEMOCRATS: REGIME
TRANSITION IN LATIN AMERICA (James M. Malloy & Mitchell A. Seligson eds., 1987); Al,
FRED STEPAN, DEMOCRATIZING BRAZIL: PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION
(1989); GIUSEPPE Di PALMA, To CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSI-
TIONS (1990); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETHTH CENTURY (1991); ELITES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN LATIN
AMERICA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE (John Higley & Richard Gunther eds., 1992).
In addition, the relationship between development and democracy in Latin
America is a sub-topic that has been widely covered in the literature. Even the Carib-
bean has its own annual reader on the subject. See DEMOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN: POLrr-
ICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES (Jorge I. Dominguez et al. eds., 1993); DE-
MOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN: MYrHS AND REALITIES (Carlene J. Edie ed., 1994).
For this reason, one must look to work that provides the most information from
the most perspectives. With regard to Haiti, one must look to Ls TRANSITIONS
DEMOCRATIQUES: ACTES DU COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI (Laen-
nec Hurbon ed., 1996).
DEMOCRACY 1N HAITI
questions on the basis of first-hand observations made from a
unique perspective. This will be followed by a general overview
of the characteristics that can be found in almost all democratic
transitions, with ground rules for contextualizing and evaluating
concrete experiences, and a list of organizational priorities, ac-
tions to be undertaken, difficulties to be found, and the hidden
traps, which are the attributes of the long road to democracy.
B. From An Emblematic Situation to a Problematic Transition
The first half of the 1990s saw most North American, South
American, and Caribbean countries choosing their governments
by universal suffrage. Across the Americas, the new era signaled
the end of authoritarian government. In the midst of this era of
regional change, the Haitian transition to democracy is unique.
It began with a national crisis,6 which in turn precipitated a
storm of international activity. The transition also became an
issue of domestic politics within the United States, a key issue of
the United Nation's regional policy, and the reference point for
the new agenda of the Organization of American States.7 This,
of course, is to say nothing of the myriad sub-issues that became
intertwined in the crisis, from the Congressional Black Caucus to
broader issues of Washington politics.8 Suffice it to say that one
6. Aristide was deposed on September 29, 1991. See FARMER, supra note 1, at 177-
96 (describing coup and its aftermath).
7. See RichardJ. Bloomfield, Making the Western Hemisphere Safefor Democracy? The
OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime, 17 WASH. Q., No. 2, 157 (Spring 1994).
8. See Seven A. Holmes, With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti
Policy, N.Y. TiMES, July 14, 1994, at A10.
It will be necessary to wait for the new era of democratic transition to reach matur-
ity before the academics will be able to fully contextualize the events in Haiti during
this period. We might, however, note that the number of articles written about Haiti
during the 1000 days of the crisis and published in U.S. and Canadian newspapers is
approximately five thousand, a sizable number.
This is the third time that this country finds itself in such a critical position: first,
between 1492 and 1515, the island of Hispaniola served as the test case for continental
conquest, complete with its "black legend" and genocidal method; secondly, between
1791 and 1803, when Haiti's war of independence ushered in the era of Latin-American
independence; and finally, the present period. In all three instances we find Haiti sub-
ject to the same over-exposure to contemporary public opinion, the same myth resur-
rected, the same general taxonomic definitions and globally significant attributes, the
same emblematic situation, which goes beyond the actual events. It signifies, on a
larger scale, the colonizations of the sixteenth century, the nineteenth century move-
ment toward independence, and now what appears to be the twentieth century's move-
ment toward democracy. It is quite possible that this country is, as a result of its periph-
eral position and its extremes, the groundhog of the Americas, the herald of new sea-
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of the few foreign leaders mentioned in the first U.S. presiden-
tial debate in October 1996 was Haitian President Ren6 Pr~val,
and that one of the few countries the candidates mentioned was
Haiti.9 This is a great deal of attention for what the Haitian mili-
tary and their U.S. tutors had believed to be a minor and incon-
sequential local coup d'itat. That perception of the coup denotes
a serious misunderstanding by the international community,
which was witnessing the birth of a new era in which the milita-
ristic states of Latin America no longer had a role. This percep-
tion of the coup also constituted a serious misunderstanding of
Haiti's national politics in which the centralization of the past
century was giving way to a new system in which the people of
the provinces, the shantytowns, and the Haitian Diaspora °
would once again have a voice in national affairs. In a word,
democracy.
Where exactly does this emblematic transition to democracy
now find itself? What is the substance of this transition and what
options are open to it over these next four years, which will lead
to the next century and presidential elections in both Haiti and
the United States in November 2000? This essay addresses the
choices facing Haiti's democracy and the prospect of finding
and way out of this quandary.
C. Temporal Parameters: The Situation before November 5, 1996
The possibility of a transition to democracy in Haiti was a
gift from the United States, at least up until the U.S. elections in
1996.11 In a certain sense, these elections held Haiti hostage.' 2
sons, always first over five centuries to arrive at the threshold of emerging historical
trends. Despite the abundance of literature on Haiti, we still lack global interpretations
of these questions of the type produced by the Haitian intellectuals of the turn of the
century. Perhaps this is because of the synchronic difficulties in situating this country at
the crossroads of the linguistic and political currents of which it is part and of simulta-
neously positioning it diachronically in different periods of the five centuries of the
histories of the Americas.
9. See Richard L. Berke, THE INAUGURATION: The Overview; Era of "Peril and
Promise" Is Ahead, Clinton Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at Al.
10. DOMINICAN RPPUBLIC AND HAI: COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 246-48.
11. It is rather unusual to comment on the date on which a scholarly article is
submitted for publication. In this particular case, however, it is necessary. I have, thus,
given this article the submission date of November 5, 1996. This is the date of the most
recent U.S. presidential election - this elections having the greatest impact on the pros-
pects for Haiti's transition toward democracy. The ascription of this date is essential for
orienting this analysis based on the situation as it existed before those elections. The
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Only time will tell if this benefitted Haiti's transition to democ-
racy. It is clear, however, that following the U.S. elections and
the establishment of a new administration, or adjustment of the
old one, the Haitian situation will move in three directions. On
the international front, stability will no longer have the same im-
portance for the tutors in Washington, and thus there will be a
greater danger of instability. With regard to the transition to
democracy, there will be an acceleration of the process as a
number of issues that have been artificially kept in suspension
will have to be answered. This too will raise greater prospects of
instability. On the political balance sheet, there will be further
instability from the Subjects, the principal actors of the dynamic,
who had been temporarily excluded, and whose return will un-
dercut the power of the leaders of the transition. This too will
raise the danger of greater instability. It is this set of dangers
that gives rise to the need for an analysis of the games and gam-
bits that led up to election day of November 6, 1996, just before
the thawing of a situation that up to that point had been kept in
frozen immobility.
D. Haiti's Hidden Face and the Need for a New Paradigm
Haiti is a country with a hidden face, but it is a'fool's secret.
The name of this country implies "the most miserable of mis-
point is that the political situation in Haiti was sought after, imposed, and maintained
so that nothing would occur that might tarnish the image of the new order. Any risk of
political agitation had to be contained and the method by which reconciliation was
imposed on the Haitian people has never permitted the disarming of the henchmen of
the previous regime, or a response to the cries for justice raised by their victims.
12. DONALD SCHULZ, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, WHITHER HAITI? (1996). The
literature reveals the existence of different conditions before and after the U.S. presi-
dential elections of November 5, 1996. We might ascribe, in general terms, a tactical
victory to the before period, and to the period after, a strategic deadlock that will cause
a regression of the progress made during the first period. Six days before the U.S.
elections, a front page article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL, made light of the electoral
impact of U.S. soldiers constructing a road of 7.5 miles in length as compared with the
1200 miles of roadway constructed by the marines of the 1915 occupation. Carla Anne
Robbins, Social Insecurity: Haiti Tastes Freedom, But Efforts to Rebuild Run Into Roadblocks,
WALL ST, J., Oct. 30, 1996, at Al. The general perception is that the effort made by the
U.S. administration to hunt down the coup plotters in defiance of congressional will,
the U.S. public's lack of interest in Haiti, and the possibility of a mutiny in the National
Security Establishment do not auger well for the future. Robert E. White in Cosmos: A
Journal of Emerging Issues 1996, Vol. 6, at 82-87. The Haitian people, thus, will have to
make the right choices. Above all, they will take their own situation in hand rather than
extend that hand to the United States.
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eries" of all the Americas. The preferences of the wealthy dictate
everything that this country produces. 13 Thus, despite its popu-
lar rhetoric, Haiti, like the international institutions that provide
it with financing, has always had an elitist budgetary orientation,
territorially biased against the rural regions and the slums.
13. In the developed countries poverty is perceived as the lowest level of the
human condition. The comfort of the varying degrees of the middle classes rests above
this, and at the top of the hierarchy, we have the various tiers of the rich. These three
categories reflect the statistical realities of the socio-economic structures of first-world
countries. See Maryse Gaudier, Poverty. Inequality, Exclusion, New Approaches to Theory and
Practice (1993) (providing excellent bibliographical revue of one thousand most impor-
tant works of last ten years). The very definition of poverty, however, is as yet unsettled
and it is common that the literature will confuse, confound, and thoughtlessly commin-
gle terms like poverty, indigence, and misery in trying to differentiate between levels,
tiers, and strata of poverty, as well as in measuring its scope and magnitude, and by
defining poverty with words such as extreme, absolute, and relative. In short, the need
to arrive at a definite vocabulary is a theoretical necessity. Oyen Else, Some Basic Issues in
Comparative Poverty Research, 134 INrr'L Soc. Sci. J., 615-626 (1992).
In countries like Haiti, it has been necessary to categorize the levels of wealth ex-
isting below "poverty" by adding "indigence" and "misery." The actual distribution of
wealth in Haiti finds eighty percent of the population living in misery, ten percent
living in indigence, five percent living in poverty, four percent living in relative ease,
and one percent living in luxury. Poverty, as the relative measure of Haitian standards
of living, has been the object of theoretical reassessments and empirical research seek-
ing to give it an exact definition. The precise definition being, "the satisfaction of es-
sential needs" and "citizen participation" within an environment of "basic service collec-
tives," as well as a "capacity to reproduce oneself without regression." See GEORGES AN-
GLADE, IN PRAISE OF POVERTY (containing concise critique of negative image ascribed to
notion of poverty as it is confounded with indigence and misery, recognition of its soli-
darity, living and surviving know-how, and its epistemological rehabilitation).
Whereas the poor have been given a privileged status in the liberation theology's
central theme of God's special relationship with the oppressed, the concept of govern-
ment by the poor is altogether different, although part of the same conceptual family.
Government by the poor refers to the goal of a society in which the vast majority of
people can aspire to that basic standard of living that has been reserved for those de-
fined in socio-economic terms as "poor." Government of the rich is the other para-
digm, that of being perpetually in the service of the consumption of wealth, of an own-
ership infrastructure of bourgeois culture and the collection of rents. Government of
the rich is, in other words, to act as though the fate of this country was purely a question
of meeting the needs of those classes living in ease and luxury. It is for this reason that
Haiti can be characterized as one of the most extreme cases of global apartheid and
exclusion. What camouflages this general understanding of poverty, the government of
the poor as opposed to the government of the rich, is simply the bad connotations of
the word "poverty." On September 18 and 19, 1995, at the first summit of the Iberian-
American Ministers of Public Works and Transport in Madrid, which had been spon-
sored by the Spanish government and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), I
neither scandalized nor surprised my colleagues by espousing the argument that inter-
national organizations are consigning us to a "government of the rich" rather than
leading us to a "government of the poor." See ACTS OF THE SUMMIT OF THE IBERIAN-
AMERICAN MINISTERS OF PUBLIC WORs AND TRANSPORT 226-35 (1996).
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Sectoral policies discriminate against agriculture and rural edu-
cation and social policies discriminate against women, landless
peasants, and the destitute. Moreover, there are few places in
the world today where survival is so dependent on a profound
change in the basic policy outlook of the state. The state must
change and the paradigm must change. Although the middle
class in Haiti and around the world talk incessantly of Haiti's
problems, they go to great lengths to avoid confronting the real
issues. Nothing alters the fact that more than eighty percent of
the Haitian population consists of peasants living in misery. One
would expect that the future of this society of outcasts would be
the focus of all concerns. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The vast body of knowledge developed with regard to this
hidden face of Haiti over the last twenty-five years is simply not
part of the calculus of decision makers and the political class.
The problem is so serious that as long as adequate measures are
not taken to address it, this country will always be in a transition
toward democracy. In the short run, we may be able to allow
ourselves the luxury of passing over this evidence and avoiding
change. But the day will come when this will no longer be possi-
ble. In the meantime, Haiti, in all of its deeper aspects and fu-
ture possibilities, will remain vastly different from the way it is
generally portrayed.
The new system will be ineffectual if it is founded on the
mistakes of the past - ignoring the peasant problem, underesti-
mating the dictatorial police system, trivializing the problem of
poor women, underestimating the uses of emigrated workers,
misunderstanding the environmental issue, and mismanaging
the public sector. The Haitian crisis is a classic case of a "govern-
ment of wealth" that should become a "government of poverty."
The latter still has great difficulty in imposing its will on the na-
tional political elite and its international counterparts.
E. The Democratic Agenda and the Legacy of the Dictatorship
1. The Principal Haitian Question: A Country of
Impoverished Peasants
Every day, four to five million Haitian peasants sink further
into misery. Everything has been taken from them, from their
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land to the their black pigs. 1 4 There remains only the hope that
in the aftermath of the U.S. elections, rural poverty will be recog-
nized as the heart of the Haitian problem. The daily lives of the
peasants today are based on the open conflicts that began in
1975, when the old order that had been put into place by the
American occupation in 1915 went to pieces. On the basis of
Port-au-Prince's centralized power, a new economic, social, and
political order was established forcing all the peasants and
merchants to produce and sell food for export, for which they
received less than ten percent of its value, while the food for
local consumption was maintained at the lowest possible price in
order to perpetuate the condition of the impoverished peas-
antry. Between 1920 and 1930, the enormous trade in rural
manual labor and the export of workers pushed nearly a quarter
of the population onto the sugar plantations in the Dominican
Republic and Cuba, and served as an outlet for local problems
caused by the peasants' war 15 and the establishment of a new
order. In the meantime, the state exacted its (confiscatory)
taxes, the bankers their interest, the import-export merchants
their (substantial) profit margins, and the landowners their
(comfortable) rents without worrying too much about how or
why this manna fell from the skies, and even less about the ex-
treme exploitation of the peasants upon whom the whole eco-
nomic structure stood. This extreme plundering, the radical ex-
clusion of the public sector, and the repressive violence, frac-
tured society in the mid-1970s and caused divisions that have yet
to be healed twenty years later. The present problem is not the
multitude of small agricultural projects, the large projects, or the
distribution of several parcels of state lands to some regions. It is
a problem of recognizing that this country is above all a country
of impoverished peasants, and of acting to make this question
the organizing principle of national public policy. This does not
mean that the country's vocation should only be agricultural, but
it does mean that entering the modem world requires a policy
that accounts for the future of four to five million peasants still
living in the countryside. The current crisis of thinking, in
which dozens of contributors have participated since the 1970s,
14. BRIAN WEINSTEIN & AARON SEGAL, HAITI: THE FAILURE OF PoLITIrCS 84-85
(1992).
15. From 1915 to 1919 U.S. Marines fought Haitian armed resistance. See FARMER
supra note 1, at 90-98.
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is a result of a coalition of local interests which has ferociously
opposed recognizing the fact that Haiti is a country of peasants.
Their project is to build a country for the five percent capable of
participating in the international market. Nothing is said of the
other ninety-five percent of Haitians. This policy will immedi-
ately lead to instability and waves of migration.
2. Migration Pressures that only Democracy Can Reduce
To recognize that Haiti is a country of peasants and to dis-
cuss the policy options that result from this realization is far
from a revelation. The Haitian peasants have been moving to-
wards any opportunity to emigrate, they have exerted pressure
on all classes of society, and their condition constitutes the heavi-
est legacy of the Duvalier regime. In the last ten years, more
than ninety-five percent of Haitians would have emmigrated if
they had the opportunity. Doubtless this is not the only example
in history of an entire people who would be ready to leave their
country when the conditions for a particular minority and sur-
vival for the great majority have become intolerable. In the Car-
ibbean at the end of the century, however, the case is unique.
This is the concrete problem Haiti presents to the majority of its
neighbors, and especially to the largest among us, the United
States. The nightmare for some Americans is to see "a flotilla of
thousands of rafts boarded by some one hundred thousand boat
people flying multicolored sails heading towards Florida under
the command of a peasant-fisherman admiral.. ." This dra-
matic threat will continue until someone addresses the cause of
the problem. This concern with emigration has forced national
and international actors to conclude that only freedom and the
democratic movement can keep Haitians in Haiti. The United
States was so concerned with the success of democratic processes
that it removed the military from public affairs and pushed for a
constitutional return of democratic movements. The same logic
underlies aid provided by international agencies under U.S. in-
fluence. For the Americans, the policy must be fixed before the
U.S. presidential elections, by providing the Haitian population
with nebulous micro-projects while waiting to put in place a
16. This is the picturesque image that I took away from the comments of Florida
elected officials presented at the Miami Conference in January 1994 on the return of
democracy to Haiti.
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broad intermediate term policy whose primary purpose would
be to keep the Haitian population in Haiti. However, only a suc-
cessful transition could guarantee that.
3. A Constrained and Financed Country Waiting for a Policy
of "Zero Migration"
Haiti is a besieged country. Around it are floating barriers
to prevent the release of migratory pressures. During the transi-
tion to democracy one hopes for a reversal of migration pat-
terns, and a policy of "zero migration" in which not a single per-
son would risk their life in a desperate flight. This will only hap-
pen with a new national policy. One needs to point out the
common interests involved, because this policy would include
neighbors and agencies that would encourage Haiti to develop
and democratize as a way of keeping Haitians at home.
As the migration crisis intensified, a group of so-called "four
friendly countries of Haiti""7 was formed to advise the U.N. Sec-
retary-General. These states, despite their common interests,
also have their differences that must be underlined to explain
the international solicitude towards Haiti and the risk that some
day it will be exhausted and come to treat Haiti as a dead end. It
is in Haiti's interest to initiate as rapidly as possible this compre-
hensive plan on "zero migration." Inasmuch as it is designed to
contain immediate migratory pressure, it is made up of a myriad
of local micro-projects administered by newly-invented organiza-
tions created to disguise the manner in which work is distributed
to local companies. For the time being, this seems to be every-
thing we could hope for outside of a coherent national policy.
4. From a Low-Intensity War to the Truce of an
Interventionist Army
In a country of exploited peasants, the control of Haiti's ru-
ral space and rural population have been the center of the con-
frontations of the last half century. The Government controlled
the countryside through Area Chiefs,"8 from which all executive,
17. The group included Canada, the United States, France, and Venezuela which
were the four principal countries with the greatest Haitian emigrant population. The
Dominican Republic was a fifth country equally concerned with this emigration prob-
lem, but could not be maintained as part of the group.
18. A "Chef de Section" commanded as many adjutants as there were bourgjardin
under him. Each adjutant had as many aides as the size of the bourgjardin required.
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judicial, legislative, commercial, police, and civil power is de-
rived and used to govern the rural level. Peasants support the
Section Chief and his entourage because the Chief's troop is not
remunerated by the state. This clanging in the countryside is a
machine making war on the daily lives of the peasants. The
machine was in high gear at the time of the 1991 coup. In the
three years following, it was reported that 5000 people were
killed and between 200,000 and 300,000 persons displaced. Peo-
ple fled from one bourg-jardin9 while trying to avoid the ubiqui-
tous police only to find a hiding place in another. This rural
warfare and its counterpart in the city slums varied in intensity,
however, so as not to alert the international community and the
Haitian Diaspora by continuous and overly systematic destruc-
tion.
The departure of the army that has stood between the tor-
turers and their victims will create serious problems that will re-
quire immediate attention after the November 5, 1996 elections.
Notably, the former soldiers have not been disarmed, and the
new national police force is not up to the task of protecting lives
and property while preventing the resurgence of conflict that
could lead to civil war. This is true even if the question of ethnic
wars currently breaking apart 20th century regimes in Europe
and Africa does not apply to the Haitian case, and one does not
gloss over the basic questions as did the Jeanclaudism of 1975-
1985.20 One must still guard against the emergence of regional-
ism of the local wars of the 19th century and the kinds of revolts
that mired the term of Jean-Claude Duvalier. We do not yet
know where the return to a focus on local politics, and the emer-
gence of new political parties based strictly on a regional level
will lead us. We cannot foresee all the consequences of the with-
drawal of foreign forces. Nevertheless, the price paid between
1991 and 1994 is high enough that an impulse to restore the
Macouto-militarists2' would immediately be met by armed popu-
19. The Haitian countryside is divided into 7500 bourgjardin, which each contain
approximately 500 to 750 inhabitants and is about 100 to 150 cases in size. The police
system of the dictatorship was organized around the bourgjardin.
20. Jeanclaudism was the Duvalierism of "Baby Doc" Duvalier, the son of "Papa
Doc." Unlike his father, Baby Doc financed his programs through the international
community. His fatal mistake was in not confronting fundamental issues of the peas-
antry and liberalizing Haiti without addressing basic social problems.
21. Tontons Macoutes were the private force of armed thugs created and used by
Papa "Doc" Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, to strike fear into the Haitian people.
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lar resistance. This return is therefore unlikely. The most obvi-
ous threat is terrorist destabilization. The current situation can
only be a temporary truce because the underlying reasons for
this war are still unresolved. The foreign forces work hard to
save face and impose superficial forms of democracy. By freez-
ing the situation, however, we are putting off the hard choices
until later. In the meantime, the Haitian peasant continues to
be enclosed in his bourg-jardin, his market, his rural section, still
denied agricultural reform and other basic changes that would
permit him to survive, and is forbidden to escape by an armada
off his coast. He survives during the truce while resisting, know-
ing that things must change in the Haitian countryside. Even if
new issues are perplexing because the worst seems imminent, he
can, nevertheless, hope for a second chance at democracy that
would not be wasted by its supporters and subverted by its ene-
mies.
5. The Dissolution of the Military-Security Apparatus and the
Inadequacies of the New National Police
When the U.S. occupation forces withdrew in 1934, they left
behind the Haitian National Guard as a local tool of political
surveillance and control. The Guard was created as an internal
police force and structured to control the countryside through
corps of local police located in rural sections. This two-tiered
organization allowed the Government to reduce the number of
uniformed forces to one per 1000 people, while in the country-
side there was only one rural agent for 25 to 50 people.22 Dur-
ing crises, the number could increase dramatically. These num-
bers were effectively doubled by the VSN militia, or the
Volontaires de la Sicuritj Nationale, which was the Tonton Macoutes
of the Duvaliers. The VSN was always five to ten times the size of
the army it monitored. There were also a myriad of other
ephemeral paramilitary groups functioning as terrorist death
22. The current desire is for a new police force made up of 5000 to 7000 people,
creating a ratio of one police officer for every 1000 to 1400 civilians. It makes no sense
to replace the old system under the pretext that the Haitian Armed Forces contained
7000 men. A police system so decentralized cannot be reduced solely to a number,
however variable, of officers. It is from this that originates the most perfect illustration
of the truly Haitian manner of the occupation of this territory by the bourgslardins. See
1 GEORGES ANGLADE, CARTES SUR TABLE 28-35 (1990) (giving most complete definition
of this concept). This analysis of the decentralized police system must precede its re-
placement by a different system.
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squads: fraph, zenglendos, attachis, ninjas, brassards rouges,
zimbabouis.3 The police developed through the seizure of polit-
ical, economic, and judicial functions, and ended with the crea-
tion of a State within the State. The police became the final re-
course for dealing with commerce or industry, with public fi-
nance, with administration of the State, and with judicial affairs.
The police became the backbone of society, and in the ways of a
police system, affected all activities from the largest to the small-
est. Thus, in ten years, the military security apparatus no longer
has a legal existence even though its former officers may still be
wealthy, powerful, and well-armed. Its dissolution was its death-
blow.
The dictatorship required an average police-to-citizen ratio
of 1/100. The ratio necessary to maintain a democracy is cer-
tainly much lower, taking into account the general mobilization
that drives the democratic process and the solidarity that was re-
born with the eradication of the local strongmen. This result,
like all the conditions necessary for the transition to democracy,
came at a high price. Can the number of police fall to between
1/1000 and 1/1400 with the deployment of a police force of be-
tween 5000 and 7000 people? My answer is a categorical, No.
The interposing foreign troops have fudged the local numbers,
and when they leave, things will become clear. By that time,
however, it may be too late. The inadequacies of the new police
force are obvious. The training of officers in ten to fifteen weeks
is an absurdly short period if one hopes to overcome the culture
of military-police violence inherited not only from duvalierisme
but also from Haitian history. By being unwilling to arm demo-
cratic movements with a competent police force, we have not
produced a pseudo-institution of Keystone Kops, incapable of as-
23. Under the old system, there were approximately 70,000 police agents, one po-
liceman for every 100 people. This is comparable to other similar police systems: the
Dominican Republic has one approximately one policeman for every seventy-five peo-
ple. In the rural sections, the numbers varied but were below 1/100, generally between
1/40 and 1/80. The system of rural police had at least 30,000 agents in 600 sections for
four or five million people. There were at least 30,000 Tonton Macoutes, and at least
10,000 members of the armed forces and their civilian colleagues in the towns and
cities.
It makes no sense to call for a new police force of 5000 to 7000 men (a ratio of one
policeman to 1000 to 1400 people) to replace a system that purportedly had 7000 po-
licemen.
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suring stability2 4 at the top of society, and unable to ward off
chaos at society's base.
II. THE GOVERNMENT OF POVERTY
A. The Object of the Transition: Justice through Law
It has been particularly instructive these last ten years to ob-
serve the popular demands that arise in a case such as Haiti's.
Some demands remain absolute, and others become secondary.
Contrary to what one would expect from a situation in which all
the elementary, needs of eliminating poverty are unsatisfied,
amelioration of material conditions has almost never been men-
tioned. Instead, the need for justice, the end of "macoutisme
duvalierien" as a system of repression, and the problems caused
by a lack of security have largely dominated popular demands.
In the presence of an inhuman spectacle of misery and its urgent
material needs, one tends to forget that the primary needs of
people are liberty, justice, and security. Because a pauper also
needs justice, the object of a transition to democracy becomes
the modem organization of justice in a State of law. This de-
mands destruction of the old military-police apparatus in order
to give birth to another organization in charge of public order.
It also requires that the institutions of justice and the body of
functionaries that make them work be reconsidered so as to pro-
duce a "just justice" and in order to guarantee a "free freedom."
Haiti must reconstruct judicial power separate from the execu-
tive power, which too often has controlled judicial power. Jus-
tice by law is thus the initial goal in the transition to democracy
as well as the object of the transition itself. It is essentially
through the achievement of this goal that Haiti can unite a
country broken in two, and create a single people from two pro-
foundly antagonistic factions. Economic analysis also poses jus-
tice as a preliminary condition necessary to development.
Following the work in Haiti of a commission of national and
international justice, the need to ensure that the horror never
returns remains. One must take judicial actions, even if merely
24. Error in method or refined perversion? Certainly, I lean toward the second
hypothesis, for the general negotiator was a brilliant American academic who had read
his classics and who understood that only oversimplification of the problematic would
not give the Haitian democratic movement an apparatus that gives it too large a margin
of autonomy.
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symbolic, to ensure that the old military police never return, and
to document the abuses that took place. Thousands of victims
have identified their torturers and call for this exorcism. In the
electoral route to stability, the current reconciliation was im-
posed whole cloth, and it has created more problems than it has
solved. Justice must be allowed to follow its own course. If there
is an area in which the Subjects' voice will be heard after Elec-
tion Day, it is in the call for justice. The first step was taken by
establishing a society without an army.2 5
B. Expectations at the Summit: Changing of the Guard or New Rules
for the Game?
A military State that has just lost its central organization
leaves orphaned all the groups that depended on it.26 The ques-
tion now is how all the non-police functions of the old appara-
tus, an apparatus whose function extended far beyond the sim-
ple protection of goods and lives, will be assumed. What is the
new equivalent in the new emerging order? Will it consist of a
single institution as before, or will there be several new centers
of power? The habits of corruption will not disappear merely by
decree.
The commercial, industrial, and financial middle class, ac-
customed to buying protection for their privileges, must now
seek a new godfather (or a new godmother) or, if conditions
demand it, new rules of the game. The contraband and drug
organizations, traditionally protected by the military chiefs, are
searching for new partners. The commands of the international
25. See Dan Coughlin, Haiti-Politics: Aristide Calls Abolition of Army Irreversible, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 62.
26. The Haitian centralized military State was a Latin-American variation of mili-
tary States, whereas the decentralized Haitian police system is a unique entity, based on
the autonomy of rural chiefs. It is this characteristic that permitted the Haitian Armed
Forces to maintain only a small number of soldiers, one twelfth the number of the
Dominican army, but nevertheless to have an identical police system. This is why the
FADH, Forces Armes d'Haiti, disbanded so easily. The Haitian bourgeois had an ariy
that it did not have to support (having allowed it to exist as a rural satrap living off the
inhabitants) and now witnesses the elimination of the police apparatus that protected
its privileges. For an analysis of the circumstances surrounding this problem, we return
to Georges Anglade, Le Monde Rural Haitian, la Guerre de Basse Intensiti, REVUE SCIENCES
HUMAINES, No. Sp6ciale Monde Rural, espaces enjeux, Mar. 1994, and the point of
departure of our work on Police and Space in Haiti in GEORGES ANCLADE, L'ATLAS CRI-
TIQUE D'HAITI (1982); GEORGES ANGLADE, CARTE DU CONTRtLE POLITIQUE 63, and its
commentary, LEs MY'rHES FONDETEURS DU POLITIQUE.
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guardians, formerly conveyed by the army, no longer have their
messengers. The State must overcome the inertia that will re-
store the old practices. Merely changing the guard will weaken a
democratic movement that came to power without having cre-
ated a new conceptual framework for the state. An ineffectual
new government will allow racketeers to construct new "fami-
lies."2 7 One hopes for a different result in a government of pov-
erty. For the moment, stability is assured by the forces imposed
from abroad. The game is not over and the question remains:
how and by what means will all the functions not directly related
to the police, those previously assumed by the military-police ap-
paratus, be replaced in the transition to democracy?
C. Impasses at the Base: The Rural World and the Threat of Chaos
The current reading of the Haitian reality is a direct threat
to the rural world. The rural sectors best define the exclusionary
boundary of Haitian society with the dominated on one side and
the dominating on the other. The powers shared elsewhere in
this society where the executive, judiciary, legislative, and police
institutions dominate are all in the hands of the rural strongmen
who administer, arbitrate, and sanction in public and private
spheres. The collapse of the government of the rural sectors was
managed with a bias toward ignorance, 28 allowing the adminis-
tration of the base of society to drift.
It is urgent to articulate the objectives and the stages of inte-
gration of the rural into national life, and to consider the treat-
ment of the migratory masses that will emerge in the years to
come. The structure of replacement foreseen in articles 62 to 65
of the Constitution of 1987 reconsiders the traditional notion
27. The word "family" in Haiti designates the dozen private groups having accumu-
lated colossal fortunes in the span of a generation, each united around a godfather (or
godmother), sharing the lucrative businesses of the country, regardless of which mili-
tary or civilian regime is in place.
28. 'The expression "bias toward ignorance" is not too strong when one takes into
account the positions of the leaders of this current democratic movement, positions
that consciously neglect the peasant question, incorporating just a little economic
jargon to camouflage the fact that they are in the service of the movement's managerial
staff and dominant classes. A second attitude, which is no better, is that of intervention
in order to make an ostensibly charitable gesture of granting a few plots of land here, of
assistance there, to gestures without serious significance, as though the dimensions of
the problems to be tackled could be satisfied with the intermediary solution of political
gestures. The problem is theoretical and universal, and thus demands reproblematiz-
ing.
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that "[t]he rural section is the smallest administrative territorial
entity of the Republic," because any understanding of the rural
sections during the post-war period has shown the falsity of such
an assertion, the sociocentrism of its vision, and the exclusion it
confers. The most probable result is that the legitimate expecta-
tion of an elected management of three members per rural Sec-
tion, and even of its assistance by a Section Assembly, will only
serve to grant three or four articles to the bases of society and
almost three hundred articles to the formal administration of
the country! The "Rural Constitution" also anticipates three
hundred central precedents from a judicial tradition ofjurispru-
dence outside the Napoleonic tradition. The modernization of
the judicial framework of codes and laws should take into ac-
count the two antagonistic spheres of the dominating and the
dominated, which have different judicial traditions. A transition
to democracy cannot succeed by ignoring from the outset the
ways and customs of the Subjects of the transition: those who
were excluded under the old order. Thus, the transition is on
the Ministry ofJustice that has been conferred twenty percent of
the national budget, the largest single part. We are awaiting the
revival of November 5, 1996!
D. The Subject of the Transition: A New Citizen Voice
The first large political demonstration following the fall of
the Duvaliers was on April 3, 1986, when 30,000 women arrived
in Port-au-Prince from all over the country to make known their
refusal to continue to be mothers, spouses, companions, sisters,
or daughters of the those who were tortured or disappeared.
They carried signs with slogans demanding the improvement of
their working conditions. I still recall the clergy's confusion in
dealing with this different kind of Subject. What could this un-
expected occurrence signify? One knew how much freedom of
speech and the exercise of speech characterized the end of pub-
lic and private oppression. But, between such a realization and
its massive presence in the form of specific demands, there was
research to be done. It required five years2 9 to galn a theoretical
29. The key texts of this projection for the ten years under observation begin with
MIREILLE NEPTUNE ANGLAmE, L'AUTRE Morrit Du DEVELOPPEMENT (1986). In La Chance
qui Passe, the proclamation of the democratic movement for the elections won in De-
cember 1990, the theory of the control of the changes by the great compassion for the
situation of women is developed at length in a political perspective. See La Chance qui
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understanding of the role of women in poverty. One actively
researched aspect was the analysis of the role of the feminine
condition as a litmus test in the transition to democracy. "As
goes the situation of women, so goes the transition" is a bar
placed high in male cultures. This is how the question is now
phrased. That which is reclaimed is nothing less than the femi-
nization of the transition to democracy. The overall improve-
ment of the condition of women will be the measure of the over-
all improvement produced by the transition. In Haiti, the gen-
eral situation is so lamentable for the great majority of people
that one will have to choose which Subjects to work for in a tran-
sition. One thinks notably of the peasants, or of the young.30
But it is not that the women as a class demonstrate that by the
sum of the characteristics they claim to be the pre-eminent Sub-
ject. This is a methodological position that may be remembered
as the major contribution of the Haitian events from 1986 to
1996. But the policy rejecting the "government of poverty"
could only face a question of this scale in the anecdotal: a minis-
try of the feminine condition and the laws of women was cre-
ated. But there was no clear policy to follow. Actions were tenta-
tive. People capitulated to inexperience and forecasted the clos-
ing of the ministry.31 The cycle is complete in less than a year!
Passe 74-80; See also GENDER AND POVERIY IN INDIA (1991); THE FEMINIZATION OF POV-
ER Y. ONLY IN AMERICA? (Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg & Eleanor Kremen, eds., 1990)
30. 'The general Subject is certainly the people/actor in all its component parts
but in situations of extreme poverty, one must still separate it into its component parts
until reaching an irreducible transcendent entity." See JACQUES RANCWtRE, LA
MgSENTENTE: POLITIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE 139-43 (1995) (discussing three aspects of peo-
ple in democracy). The feminine in poverty is more than a social class, more than an
age group, more than a socio-professional status. It is the obligation to survive through
times of catastrophe in poverty that stamps the feminine as a pre-eminent Subject.
31. Until recently women had only organized into traditional groups. But antici-
pating a thaw following November 5, 1996 there is now a league dedicating to advanc-
ing the political participation of women in elected posts. This opens an entirely new
chapter of feminism in poverty specifically addressing female poverty. While the femi-
nine is the Subject among Subjects that emerges in this conjecture, the shanty-town is
the place among places. In the short term, especially if nothing serious is done, the
rural populations will again find itself there. The near future of Port-au-Prince can
easily see a climb between two and three million shanty-towns for less than 500,000
people in the city proper. The challenge of the coming century will be its capacity to
develop the shantytowns, in which will live three quarters of the population of Latin
America. Moreover, the location of the Diaspora has revealed itself as an amplifier of
popular demands and as a sanctuary for democracy reclaimed. The overall interpreta-
tion that I will advance for the Diaspora is that it is an escape valve used by the "govern-
ment of wealth." The Diaspora is on the outside, while actually living a real-time fiction
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Yet that did not exhaust the question, and certainly did not over-
come it. It will endure as long as general poverty endures, along
the high and low points of the transition toward democracy in
the coming century.
E. The Erruption of Words from Unexpected Places: Provinces,
Shanty-Towns, and Diaspora
The new voices are as vital to the transformation as the gen-
eral mobilization of the people. This demands a reproblematiz-
ing of the organization of the space capable of accounting for
the new places from which voices have emerged. Provinces that
the harsh centralization of the twentieth-century had rendered
inarticulate are suddenly beginning to speak again. Shanty-
towns forced into the silence of the grave during the dictator-
ships now find their turn to speak. A faraway and detached Dias-
pora that was one thought lost is settling in to the heart of the
process in order to speak for itself. The core of the metropolis
became so important that it detached itself from the rest of the
country in order to live in a quasi-independent manner. The old
urban hierarchy, having lost its leadership, has left parties with
the autonomy that the provinces will now use for their renewal.
The shantytowns, marginalized at their beginnings, have with
time become entirely separate categories so that one must now
recognize, next to the urban and the rural, this new third cate-
gory that will soon be the vessel of more than fifty percent of the
populations of Latin America. The coming century will be more
shanty-town than urban. As for the Haitian Diaspora, it has
awoken as a national force, and one must think of it as one
thinks of the nine other departments of the country. The meta-
phor of the tenth department by which it has been designated
since 1986 has come to represent its role in the national dy-
namic. In short, a new special model with multiple centers has
replaced centralization, giving importance to the local level,
there where the protectors of the citizenry will be able to exer-
cise their electoral sovereignty.
of being on the inside in the "tenth department"; the Diaspora, predominantly of rural,
provincial, and shanty-town origin, has placed itself outside of the ninety-five percent of
the oppressed and outside of the reach of the "government of wealth" in order to ac-
company the emergence of the new paradigm of the "government of poverty."
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F. The Plan of the Transition: Yes to the Market, Yes to the State
Once the democratic movement came to power, the mass of
voters began to demand a decrease in the cost of living. Six
years later, one still hears this demand to satisfy the basic needs
of more and more people, as quickly as possible.
Economic change means adjusting the position of the ma-
jority of citizens on the five-rung economic ladder which in Haiti
represents misery, indigence, poverty, comfort, and wealth.
More than eighty percent of the population, the Subjects of this
transition, live in abject misery because they cannot satisfy any of
their basic needs. For them, poverty is still a goal, except when
demagogues promise that everyone will be at the level of com-
fort or wealth. In an effort to prevent migration, the objective of
the economic transition is to make the majority pass from misery
to poverty, the latter level being the near-satisfaction of basic
needs including a roof over one's head, health, education, rudi-
mentary infrastructure, etc. Currently, ninety percent of Hai-
tians are below poverty, less than five percent live in poverty, and
five percent are above it. The transition from misery to poverty
and the problem of achieving "zero migration" is modest, but it
is the largest of all the revolutions possible in Haiti. This policy
gives priority to dealing with the masses' poverty. The other pol-
icy gives priority to governing hi the interest of the wealthy. One
therefore comes back again to the ancient, twenty-five-century-
old choice between democracy and oligarchy. Under certain
conditions of social justice, the alternative to the current policy
would institutionalize the state of right and recognize the preem-
inence of the market, while recognizing the strong need that lo-
cal community government has for a state, for even in the eco-
nomic sphere its regulatory presence is necessary to protect the
weakest groups and the environment. This "Yes to the market,
Yes to the State" dramatizes the real debate concerning the
privatization of state enterprises, grants an indispensable role to
the strong32 need for a state, and gives the market its own role in
32. The Haitian state is weak, and it is used to benefit those who get rich from the
destruction of the country. One example that will clarify this matter is the use of non-
biodegradable containers by several flourishing Haitian juice companies. The enrich-
ment of the owners comes not only at the expense of the pollution of the environment,
but also from the impoverishment of the Government, which annually invests millions
of dollars through the Ministry of Public Works to treat these containers, which obstruct
the sewers of Port-au-Prince each rainy season. The catastrophe is national, but the
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economic growth and the resulting fall in the cost of living. This
is the formula that we must find a way of applying.
D. Agrarian Reform as Starting Point and Revival
Our policy in the transition to democracy must encourage
production, because in the past, Haiti has perished from not
producing. One critical element in the framework for reviving
production is a specific reform of the land and water. The other
is the simultaneous implementation of an industrial network for
the input of agriculture and the transformation of agricultural
output. It is the double, converging influence of these two fac-
tors that will advance the production of goods and increase their
value.
This is the starting point for a long series of complex trans-
formations that must be followed by financial and economic re-
quirements. The starting point clearly addresses the current
peasant, rural, and agricultural questions of the country. Fur-
thermore, it traces one possible solution to the problem of the
shantytowns' abundant and under-utilized manpower. We must
also admit that we do not know everything. We understand the
general skills, enumerate the cultural particularities, and fully
list the potentialities. We have already experimented with the
scope and limits of diffusion of innovations.
It is essential, although perhaps unrealistic, to aim for the
conversion of Haitian agriculture and to get 250,000 farms to
increase their individual production each year until the end of
the century. This would be a goal beyond expectation. The lo-
gistics of getting these master-gardeners to be able to exploit
their theoretical and practical mastery require that the land be
cultivated so as to be accessible and secure through prolonged
weak state lets it happen by governing according to the paradigm of wealth, and by
turning the restoration of State authority into an activity which aggravates the poverty of
the masses, street merchants and others, who are accused of polluting the streets with
the plastic containers. One could gather together a hundred stories of this kind to
illustrate why the trees are cut down, why garbage accumulates in Port-au-Prince, why
the environment is destroyed, and those who enrich themselves by these tragedies. See
ANDRE CORTEN in L'fTAT FAiBLE: HAITI ET REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE (1989) (studying
characteristics and consequences of this weak state). The weak state is desired and
maintained by the major participants in the economic sphere, except that they do not
have the point of view of the working people who need to be protected. It is no longer
the Government that needs to be regenerated. One comes back again to the ancient,
twenty-five-century-old choice between democracy and oligarchy.
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reclamation. To achieve this we have created a National Insti-
tute of Agricultural Reform (INARA), and expect, upon the re-
newal after the U.S. elections, a law effecting water and land re-
form and a restructuring that will curb fragmentation."3 Land
reform is not only necessary to effect the leap from misery to
poverty, by far the most fundamental social change possible in
Haiti, but also to guarantee a start to all the other sectors and
stages of national life.
E. The Industrialization of Agriculture Upstream and Downstream
The agricultural restructuring will demand massive man-
power to produce the necessary agricultural input. It is neces-
sary to tie this to the increased capacity of value added through
the transformation of agricultural products. It is by this double
transformation of the input and output of agricultural produc-
tion that the policy of giving priority to the poor will be put into
effect. Haiti must determine which resources to possess and
master3 4 in order to raise production and revenues, and under
which conditions the value added to agricultural products by the
progress of industrial transformation become a factor increasing
production and revenue for the great majority of the workers.
There is no policy that can satisfy basic needs without finding a
global strategy of production. It is necessary to increase the
workers' resources in order to generate a gross consumer de-
mand that the Haitian market would then satisfy. For this to
happen, there must be a viable rural middle3 5 class that expands
from 50,000 to 250,000 rural households. At the same time, in
33. In holding the inauguration of the November 2, 1996 program of agrarian
reform, in a grand ceremony at Pont Sonde in the low valley of the Arbonite, three days
before the U.S. elections, President Ren6 Prtval, in targeting this most important of
symbols, has begun the thaw of positions. The INARA, which is the instrument of this
central reform in the democratic project, the mechanism par excellence of the mecha-
nisms of the revival, in charge of one and a half million cultivated parcels in the coun-
try, is completely undersized: it barely had a single employee the first year of its creation
(July, 1995 -July, 1996).
34. Such resources include land, water, credit, resources, markets.
35. In Haitian society, there is a great debate about this notion of middle classes.
This is all the more important in the transition toward democracy, in an era that an-
nounces itself as a continuous work of middle classes for which it will be necessary to
provide the most precise economic, social and cultural contours possible. Can one
speak, as I do, of a peasant middle class whose annual revenue per farm will be on the
order of 30,000 in Haitian local currency in 1996? I think so, but that remains to de-
bated.
1997] DEMOCRACY IN HAITI 1199
each province the transformation capacities must be imple-
mented to add value to the products and to serve as an incentive
to production. Finally, each province's central city must be en-
dowed with the services and resources required in that particular
36region.
III. THE RULES OF TRANSITIONS
A. The Rules of the Transitions to Democracy
The experience of the transition to democracy in Haiti dur-
ing the last ten years, and notably, the difference between the
vision that has slowly ripened through democratic change dur-
ing the post-war period, permits the formulation of a series of
rules of transitions. The first of these rules is the general mobili-
zation, which allows the authoritarian regime to be overtaken
and the new regime to maintain its course if it has an overall
vision. This mobilization arises from unexpected places. In Ha-
iti, the provinces have been mute for a century, the shantytowns
reduced to silence, and much of the population scattered in a
Diaspora. Among the voices that demand to be heard in a
frenzy of talk are those who were formerly excluded and now
have become the new historical Subject. They express authentic
36. The contents set forth in the preceding paragraphs have examined the bound-
aries that delimit the territory that we have called the "government of poverty." I be-
lieve that it is necessary to confront the fact that poverty will be Haiti's lot in the 21st
century, as seem in its shantytowns, but also with its real wealth of solidarities. Should
one want to combat poverty by the program of structural adjustment, to abolish poverty,
to proclaim growth without poverty, as do the texts of the World Bank? See, e.g., Struc-
tural Adjustment and Poverty: a Conceptual, Empirical and Policy Framework (1989); Imple-
menting the World Bank's Strategy to Reduce Poverty: Progress and Challenges (1993). Should
one say that one can arrange a significant percentage of the people in comfort or
wealth? Obviously not. It is irresistible for me to see in the case of Haitian poverty an
analogy to the manner in which the "question of the black race," the racism of the
inequality of the races, etc., has roused the Haitian scholars at the end of the 19th
century. Because it is out of the question to change one's race, at least one can change
the paradigm: the different courses of negritude that were born during the course of
100 years. Who, then, is afraid of the "government of poverty" in a country condemned
to poverty for the next 100 years? We are instead condemned to revisit poverty - one
which is far from the conceptions of charity or of patronizing women, but also far from
the unrealistic promises, pious wishes, and other romantic promises. The word "pov-
erty" actually creates more fear than the thing which is defined as access to the mini-
mum of everything. IN PRAISE OF POVERTY, supra note 16, at 5. It is necessary to imagine
a convivial society of citizens whose per capita income could be very modest but whose
quality of life would be at an acceptable minimum, spanned by social networks of soli-
darity, political participation, of justice by right. This objective is, for the time being,
within the political and scientific means of Haiti.
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ruptures through their radical demands for justice, immediate
expectation of the satisfaction of elementary needs, sovereignty
of elected citizens, and subversion of civil liberties. These princi-
pal means for spelling this grammar of transitions all spring
forth simultaneously on the radio, on the walls, and in the
streets. They create an atmosphere of permanent celebration
that Henri Namphy, the General in charge of the Haitian Execu-
tive who was overwhelmed by the events that followed the over-
throw of Duvalier, characterized 1986 as "democratic revelry." I
do not see how a process of transition toward democracy could
be characterized by the serenity of the Subject, of calm in the
streets, and of moderation and responsibility in all things.
Groups make use of the freedom to protest and the freedom to
speak, fundamental rights that were won from the dictatorship,
to take every opportunity possible to proclaim that repression is
never to return.38 There is a festive atmosphere in the expecta-
tions of a new epoch, so that, for his part, the U.S. ambassador
serving in 1990, Alvin Adams, who was equally overwhelmed by
37. On the day of Duvalier's departure, on walls around the country, in the prov-
inces as in the capital, one could see written in Creole, "A non-renewable, four-year
mandate" for the presidency. The long nightmare of thirty years had to be exorcised.
The walls were thus beginning to speak of the exercise of the population's right to vote.
Further, the candidates for presidency, numerous in these first weeks, went on the ra-
dio to complain that the president's term was too short and the non-renewal was dras-
tic. The Constitution of 1987 was going to retain this, but added a year to make it a five-
year mandate, and consecrated the exercise of sovereignty by all citizens in elections at
all levels. In this way the people were able to begin again after thirty years by subjecting
each call to the presidential ballot-box to a total abstention of their massive vote: in
November, 1987, they killed themselves out to vote for Gourgue; in January, 1988, they
abstained for Manigat; in December, 1990, they rushed to elect Aristide; and Preval was
elected with less than thirty percent voter participation in 1995. Thus it is essential that
the exercise of sovereignty be consolidated through the choice of 2200 elected officials
in Haiti, and that the Permanent Electoral Counsel, which the Constitution anticipated
in Articles 191 to 199, reach the threshold of trust and legitimacy necessary to call the
citizens to the polls every two years for elections.
I believe that the most accurate interpretation of the 1991 coup comes properly
from reflexes overwhelmed by change: the democratic era of the U.S. people took
flight in the Haitian experiment of the beginning of the 1990s, and the historical man-
date was to describe how a caterpillar becomes a butterfly and not to block the muta-
tion. Where one was waiting for a great chronicler, one saw a small firebrand. The
international scandal that this coup provoked shows that the experiment that unfolded
in Haiti and all of Latin America has been hugely underestimated.
38. The orderly management of this trial in the streets seems to me sufficiently
linked to the need to oversee the transition, that one takes note of the festive aspect of
the transitions as analogous to the political conventions and election periods elsewhere,
including, notably, in the United States.
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events that preceded the election of Aristide, characterized the
events as "apres bal tambou lou," meaning "after the ball, the
drums become heavy." This saying, is a well-known Haitian prov-
erb whose equivalent must exist in all cultures, and in the revolu-
tionary political tradition of the dream of a "Grand Soir" in
which the Haitian experience is followed by the rude awakening
of the "Petit Matin" of a country drained and fragile as it gets
back on its feet.
B. A General Mobilization and a Vision of the Whole
Any politics that satisfies popular wishes must have the ca-
pacity to mobilize a large majority of the population to support
the sequence of transformations during the transition. At the
beginning of the process, there is not yet a tradition of respect
for governmental legitimacy borne out of elections. Without a
general mobilization, it is practically impossible to use force ef-
fectively, leaving behind the authoritarian status quo, destroying
the central apparatus of the old regime, and constructing a real
democracy. These moments of general mobilization are rare
turning points in the history of a people because they are built
on categorical rejections and entrenched grievances that consti-
tute a "No" to lawlessness, exclusion, and exploitation, and a
"Yes" to justice, participation, and the satisfaction of basic needs.
Today, the general mobilization is the best means of putting into
motion all classes of society for the overall benefit of the nation.
This exceptional condition, however, is insufficient to accom-
plish all the changes by itself. It is still necessary to have a vision
of the alternative that can be a fulcrum based on native skills and
characteristics. Fifty years of seeking democracy in Haiti has
cleared away superfluous demands. The search of supporters of
democracy for a more just and more dignified society has cre-
ated a tool. One of the peculiarities of the democratic tradition
in Haiti is that it has combined, since its origin, two modes of
existing. Its leading characteristic is that it is political, its func-
tion is organization and mobilization, while it is also intellectual,
reproblematizing, and exploring the routes to take. s9
39. I ask myself if in fact this classification of the democratic profiles is not related
to this difference between organizers of the "Grands Soirs" and laborers of the "Petit
Matins"? Hasn't it always been true that the rare combination of these two dimensions
gives birth to the possibility of democracy? But the virtuoso performances by the "ar-
tistes du Grand Soir" taking control in 1991, losing it in 1994, reclaiming it in 1996, and
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C. Radical Claims
Initially the new political Subjects make radical demands.
This radical tendency takes many forms as the process evolves.
In the beginning, there will be a symbolic settling of accounts. It
will be reflected in destroyed homes, burnt cars, firing of civil
servants, and, unfortunately, public executions of a few promi-
nent henchmen of the old regime. The essential impact, how-
ever, lies deeper, in the change in colors, the replacement of the
government, and the open path to transition. There are three
orders of radical demands. It starts injustice as an object of tran-
sition, where the construction of the new state law demands the
punishment of those accused of injustices. It is then in the Sub-
jects of those transitions in which they have the right to speak, to
vote, and to be given priority in political participation after years
of deprivation. Finally, it is in the economic control of inflation
and the end of the robbery of the state treasury. It is at this
point that the people's radical demands will differ from the
political organizers with whom the people have allied.40 The
middle class administration will advance pretexts based on ex-
pertise, pragmatism, and realism to moderate the radicality em-
bedded in the new female 41 and male speakers. These radical
demands would be uprooted and thwarted. The political econ-
omy of this maneuver is so obvious, the fall of the transition
would unquestionably follow in a short period. We risk finding
ourselves within the power of the "petite elite" against the claims
of all the people. The first signs of this final split between the
base and the summit of the democratic movement would be easy
solidifying it in 2000, must contribute something to the "Petit Matins" of the country
that constitute ninety percent of the poor peasants, miserable women, and sacrificed
youth. The judgment of this missed opportunity by history would be terrible.
40. It is the great number of people on the platform and new female speakers who
will maneuver this change. Everybody speaks out and makes claims in the beginning of
the transition. Eventually it becomes discordant and indecent: even the army com-
plained bitterly about the dictatorship for being the biggest victim of the purges. We
may then pretend not to recognize the real Subjects of the transition which define their
fresh and colorful demands, radical and immediate. First, the female speakers which
present the state of the victimization of their gender or the duration of the centraliza-
tion and their just fear that the transition will also be at their expense, and then the
other speaker of serious things, the miserable peasants, from the provinces, from the
city, or from the shantytowns. It is seven million poor Haitian peasants who tell the
other twenty percent that the solution can not continue by this apartheid exclusion. No
distancing of any economic maneuver may ignore the fate of the peasants.
41. The feminine voice has been so uncommon that now it rings out startlingly.
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to recognize, as it is not the subject of a plot or conspiracy to
tame the radicality of the people's demand. The day would
come that the people would reclaim their role.
D. Immediate Expectations
The new political Subjects started with immediate political
demands. The immediacy is a refusal to continue to be presently
sacrificed for a better future. This once-familiar argument has
disappeared of late, because it was always the same people who
had to live on hope while others always enjoyed immediate bene-
fits. Their impatience was clear, and we saw street demonstra-
tions proclaiming the slogan "immediately." But there are lim-
ited means of immediately achieving anything significant. We
must account for the poor, maintain a minimum critical sense,
and suggest answers to interference from abroad. In this coun-
try, that is the most overanalyzed since the war, shot through
with "twenty thousand expert reports,"42 everything ended in dis-
aster. In this country, there is an obsession with foreign aid and
a psychological expectation of abusing it43 without any obliga-
tion to obtain results for the last five decades of development. It
is time to try something else. The old practice of expecting
everything of outside subsidies created a double problem. Peo-
ple were not required to live within their means and did as much
as possible with what they had. It did not take into account local
know-how or the people's actual needs as the preferred way of
making immediate changes. There are numerous illustrations.
In a rural world where movement and communication occurred
along a dense network of footpaths, where improvements would
have had an immediate effect on the economic opportunities of
the poorest, money was spent on makeshift but lucrative mainte-
nance work on the few roads that supported the economy of the
rich. It is not a question of forsaking one network for another,
42. This has continued at a rate of one report per day for more than half a cen-
tury!
43. One day we will have to go over what happened in Haiti between 1946 and
1996 in the chapter of international cooperation and the presence of foreign advisors.
We tried an analysis of the problem in 1982 in I'Atlas critique d'Haiti, with card of the
Presence etrangere and a commentary on Les mystifications de l'aide. L'ATLAs CRITIQUE
D'HAITI, supra note 28; PRESENCE ETRANGERE 69; LES MYSTIFICATIONS DE L'AIDE 68-72.
One of the most damaging results has been from successive governments preaching
that the national dynamism is nothing but a liaison of those receiving from who are
lending them.
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but of acknowledging for the first time the different networks.
What is needed is a wisdom for immediate and radical change;
the two invented rules for the mobilization of the first step of the
transition toward democracy.
IV. RISKS AD RIFFS OF TRANSITIONS
A. Glory and Misery of the Long March of Democracy
Since the end of the Second World War, the Haitian demo-
cratic movements have had fifty years of development. In 1990,
they coalesced for an overwhelming accession to power. Now,
the biggest threat comes from inside the organization, which
must build and reinforce itself in order to overcome inherent
organizational problems." This is the glory and the misery of
the long path of democracy. The first task is to structure the
sensibilities of the political parties. Here there are three appar-
ent difficulties: first, the people have an inherent distrust of the
political parties. Second, there is no rival for the charismatic
leadership of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Third, the social class of
the party leaders is a problem. In this country of extreme exclu-
sions, all the party functionaries come from the dominant class
and depend on the state for their living, when what is required is
a real rupture in standard conceptions, orientations, and prac-
tices in order to benefit eighty percent of the population.
Briefly, in this country of rarity, when it is difficult to target eve-
rybody, one must see the hierarchy break with its traditional ways
and the government of the rich become a government of the
poor.
The third glory of the democratic government, created in
the 1987 constitution, is four levels of representatives. But in
this country of distortions, the radical claims and the urgency of
the people's movements have difficulty being carried by the rep-
resentative structure. Participation risks being strangled, and is
threatened by a familiar syndrome: advisors who decide without
44. The biggest trap hidden in the obligation of representation, is the bureau-
cratic monopolization of representation that should be controlled by participants, citi-
zens, and grassroots social movements. The recent history of the fall of the socialist
state in the USSR of privileged parties is nothing more than the strangling of people by
the machines of representation. At a moment when modem democracy commands
these organizations, their risks and their rifts are as real as the people's mistrust of
political parties. The Haitian tradition of political organization is laden with massive
bureaucracies.
DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
any other form of legitimacy and whose books and opinions have
no connection with the nature of the country. The historical
Subject of this country's transition has been excluded by the
elected and by the advisors. For the last glory, and the last mis-
ery of the long walk of the democracy, we must continue the
democratization, and not accept inaccurate categorizations that
are limited to appearances and formal administration without
content, beginning with the democratic parties who function un-
democratically.
B. Building Political Parties in a Land of Way Subjects and Men
of Destiny
After years of experience, often underground and only
partly successful, the democratic political organizations find
themselves ready to operate in the open. Years of open resist-
ance to dictatorship from abroad, and a long series of reorgani-
zations within the ranks have now come to fruition throughout
the country and in the Tenth Department. This moment in
1996 belongs to the political parties and we cannot help but
rejoice in the advent of a future modem era. The Haitian polit-
ical tradition, however, has also produced from this fertile land,
men of destiny, who the party organizations look upon suspi-
ciously, because the people have clearly rejected the traditional
saviors, who now win merely one percent to three percent of the
vote. The charismatic leadership of Aristide, however, is a differ-
ent question, because he is truly a representative of the people.
He continues to embody their hopes and he may well be Presi-
dent again in the year 2000. But it is through the structure of
the democratic political parties that institutions must live.
Through voting and political debate and through the rotation of
power, daily administration is separated from the executive in a
democracy. In the future, Haiti will probably swing between the
different political parties that resulted from the 1990 conver-
gence, Lavalas. In the absence of strong political parties, the
weight of a leader like Aristide is too strong to allow the political
culture to share other visions and other means of daily adminis-
tration. This charismatic leadership could coexist with the con-
struction of diverse democratic parties if the masses were not so
wary of the political parties that they have left the organizations
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with nothing but party bureaucrats.4" The construction of polit-
ical parties that are truly democratic and popular, with people of
upper and lower middle class, presents a serious problem of
popular representation. At present, people do not feel them-
selves represented in the majority that supposedly represents
them in the 46th legislative assembly. These elected representa-
tives do not affiliate themselves with the party under whose ban-
ners they were elected in the democratic movement. This is a
troubling development in the democratic institutions. The key
question then is, given the charismatic leadership of Aristide,
and the mistrust of the people toward the parties, how can we
make these half-dozen organizations sufficiently democratic and
popular so that it will not be the work of one man?
C. Modernity of the Political Parties and the Nomenclature Origins
The progressive growth of political parties is followed by so-
cial projects, government policies, and political platforms that
reflect the opinion of the groups. The establishment of the plat-
forms follows debate within the party. The shared vision embod-
ied in the platform is the foundation of the parties' modernity.
We do not follow a traditional leader with unknown beliefs and
uncertain positions, but collectively apply rules that we agree to
respect. The modernization in the parties is thus accomplished
without sacrificing the personal touch essential to politics. Each
member is bound by their adherence to a set of publicly known
beliefs, to which allegiance to an individual leader is secondary.
It is sad that the actual leadership of the main parties that share
in official democratic representations are, without exception,
from the leading class, which is made up mostly of the middle
class. These leaders are not in a position 46 to accept the de-
45. Until now, intellectuals have not come to grips with the mistrust of the last ten
years in the country and in the Diaspora. The mass movements and grassroots organi-
zations lack a traditional hierarchy. Perhaps the understanding we seek will arise only
by linking shantytowns with the countryside. It is clear that the present analytical tools
will not help us much in understanding the disillusion of the people with the parties
and organizations. We then saw Duvalier fall from attacks from shantytowns, but we
have not accounted for the lack of traditional leaders and party ranks. The same phe-
nomenon has continued over the last ten years.
46. This political attitude comes from whatJacques Ranciere called the misunder-
standing, La Mesentente, which is not of the order of simple mistrust or of voluntary
ignorance. RAx'ciPRE, supra note 34. "By mistrust we understand a special type of spo-
ken situation. Where one of the speakers, hears and does not hear, what the other is
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mands of the ideas of the transition that come from poor peas-
ants and poor women whose voices are from the shantytown.
There is a risk in treating basic problems in a political fash-
ion with fiction and anecdotes. Daunting problems requiring
complex solutions are handled with vague and ineffectual ges-
tures. In the name of militancy, the most acute questions receive
trivial answers. Anything not emanating from one's clan is un-
dercut. Even worse, the tools available to those various factions
who depend on their proximity to the State for their existence
are used to de-legitimize the issues surrounding the vast majority
of the population and to justify exclusion of these new Subjects
who threaten the privileges of the state bureaucrats. One
ridicules every disturbance, without realizing that the function of
the petty bourgeoisie is to protect itself from what if fears. It is
terrified of the fact that Haiti is a country of poor peasants, of
poor women, and therefore, a country of footpaths, markets,
market women, rural administrative units, and boat people. It is
not the country that the small bourgeoisie envisions in its com-
placent introspection.
D. The Elected, the Excluded, and the Experts
The 1987 Constitution provided for more than 2200 elected
positions that had incumbents who would be members of com-
munal, municipal, departmental, and national assemblies. This
breakdown into political groupings would guarantee the repre-
sentation of the people and a voice for their local concerns and
demands. Furthermore, pursuant to the Constitution, the gov-
saying. The misunderstanding is not between the one who says white and the one who
is saying black, it is the conflict between the one who says white and the other who says
white but does not hear at all the same thing or does not hear the other say the same
thing under the name white." Id. at 12. This gathers all the drama of the ranks who
bring disaster to the basis of the political organizations in this land of apartheid.
Even if the educated people of this county take part in the political parties of the
middle and lower middle classes, there has been little scholarly work done, and even
less public debate on other possible approaches. Everything follows the first rule of
politics: stay in power as long as possible. In the book, Dans Haiti quel developpement, the
architects of the regroupement Collectif Paroks explored around 1976 a project for the
low, oppressed middle class, the PBO - petite bourgeoisie opprime, by this fact differentiat-
ing it from the golden middle class, the PBD -petite bourgeoisie dor&, which we will find in
the majority of the Lavalas. DANs HAITi QUEL DEVELOPPEMENT (E.Olivier, CL. Moise,
CH Manigat, eds.) Even though it is a raw instrument of work, it presents a first distinc-
tion between the PBO and PBD which present a certain account of belonging to the
ranks.
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ernment would come from the majority of the Senate and the
House of Representatives. This would reinforce the institutions
that Democracy needs to maintain itself as a process. In this
country of failed Apartheid, however, the distance between the
elected and the excluded is so great that the latter will always
feel sufficiently underrepresented that they will request the right
to participate directly. The elected incumbents therefore re-
ceive their mandates from demonstrations in both urban and ru-
ral areas. Add to this the contributions of experts from the civil
service4 7 and expatriate experts who make their decisions inde-
pendently of the elected and the excluded who stifle all advocacy
for change. In moments of political indecisiveness, the techno-
structures of local administrations have fallen into the habit of
governing with their interests in mind and with no connection to
the elected political incumbents. It is well known that an unsta-
ble situation in Haiti provides foreign experts with the best am-
munition to influence national politics. A return to normal im-
plies that the experts will have a clear vision of the problem and
will be extremely active. The portrait of this classic situation is
the beginning of a process by which the three partners, the ex-
cluded, the elected, and the experts, are separate from one an-
other. The ultimate objective is to bring the three actors closer
so that they can eventually work together. This will take a long
time in a society divided into two unequal parts including a vast
majority of illiterate peasants living in abject poverty, and an ed-
ucated, urban, well-to-do minority with a knowledge of assem-
blies and political representation. In order to fully grasp the ex-
tent of the necessary changes, the urgency that the demands be
truly radical, and the need for expectations to be immediate so
that there is a glimmer of hope for democracy, one needs to
refer constantly to the five financial levels of the Haitian popula-
tion: abject poverty (eighty percent), indigence (ten percent),
poverty (five percent), comfortable means (four percent) and
wealth (one percent).
47. The civil service is the State institution that operates and manages all the re-
quired transformations. Currently, only a quarter of its employees are indisputably
qualified to work. Reforming the corps of civil servants, a prerequisite to the re-launch-
ing of Haiti, raises the issue of what to do with the remaining three-quarters of the
sinecurists who have no other employment opportunities. The famous slogan "Change
the State" which means change the paradigm, also means changing the civil service and
many other things: it will be the redeployment of the government, expected at the end
of 1996.
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E. The Democratization of Democracy
While the September 1994 Haiti operation, Restore Democ-
racy, set in motion a process of change, it also impeded political
transformation so that Haiti would not become an issue in the
1996 U.S. elections. It might have been a good strategy. It has
been, however, a long twenty-five months for the Americans in
charge of stabilizing the situation. The extensively supervised
democracy of the last two years has taken the required positions
and made the minimal gestures, especially regarding elections,
reconciliation, retaining the population, and extending the
mandate. There have been a few problems with the policy of
containment, particularly in the case of privatization. The peo-
ple have good reason to wonder if privatization only serves to
strengthen the oligarchy that has been duping them for two cen-
turies. The moment of truth has finally arrived with the democ-
ratization of democracy.4 Now the concern should be that the
Haitians might find themselves alone, without having been al-
lowed to create the necessary instruments to manage the
processes of change. The evolving situation will carry with it all
chances of succeeding and all the possibilities of veering out of
control.4 9 Justice, the primary factor in any aspiration to create a
democracy, will be at stake. The absolute and integral reconcili-
48. The greatest threat to democracy is the acceptance of a bastardized version.
But a cheapened democracy might seem more appropriate to a situation of such pov-
erty. Reactionaries most frequently use the argument that democracy is incompatible
with a country of illiterates, as if the population could not know what is good for it! The
sought-after formula would consist of certain formal appearances, especially with re-
spect to elections (usually overturned or ignored by the constituents who are less naive
than one might think), but also of maintaining the wealth paradigm. One aspect would
nonetheless entail leaving to the leaders of the political parties the representation in
the Senate, the House, and the assemblies in exchange for the continuity of the State.
The fundamental problem is that it is impossible to name an oligarchic paradigm a
democracy; it would defy twenty-five centuries of definitions.
49. On Sunday November 3, 1996, two days before the U.S. elections, Jean-Ber-
trand Aristide inaugurated his own political party, bringing to four the number of par-
ties claiming their origins in the Lavalas movement of 1990. It is a sign of the times
that, as the floodgates open following the U.S. elections, the undisputed leader of Ha-
iti's political and social crossroads subscribes to this requirement of modernization with
the slogan "democratization of democracy." The new delimitation of the various demo-
cratic organizations soon will be determined in the senatorial elections scheduled for
December 1996 but which in all likelihood will be postponed until the spring of 1997.
The procedures used to select candidates and the eventual withdrawal mechanisms
available in the second round of elections will illustrate the degree of maturity attained
by the different democratic factions.
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ation that was imposed has still not allowed the horror to be ex-
orcised. The new institutions that are crucial to stability, notably
the national police, are troubling in their present state. The ju-
diciary should be disbanded, as the army was, so that it can be
rebuilt with a clean slate. The Government's options regarding
economic growth, which are currently restrained in the interest
of equity, are either to focus on wealth (an oligarchy), or focus
on poverty (a democracy). The people, the Subjects revealed by
the political climate, demand the freedom given to citizens, no-
tably participation in politics and in the elections, in order for
democracy to become the factory that creates the middle class
and extricates the people from the accelerating misery. All this
must be done now, for democracy is not a defined gradation or a
fixed stage. Democracy establishes itself here, in the present. As
a means of advancement, it destroys any incompatible element.
Democracy is always accompanied by forward motion, immedi-
acy, the here and now. In the end, General Namphy's "democ-
racy spree" was not such a bad reading! It is understandable why
the first rule is the general mobilization. Without mobilization,
the bet is not even worth placing, while with mobilization, noth-
ing is any less certain, but the opportunity passes. °
CONCLUSION
A. The Transition as Reputation: A Global Interpretation
The global interpretation with which I conclude is that as a
transition succeeds, it mutates and causes a basic change in per-
ception. It is all the more significant that the transition is an end
in itself. The objective sought is a transition to democracy, a vir-
tual-state that was never established once and for all. The case is
reborn as another, with a different name. The upheavals that
accompany these transformations, the economic miracle of such-
50. The twenty-five months dating from September 19, 1994 to November 5, 1996
will probably be the source of many future works as an exceptional opportunity in a
national history. On the one hand, there emerges a desire to turn Haiti into an U.S.
success story for obvious election purposes. On the Haitian side, the dissimulation of
objective sought and the vagueness of the resulting strategy, led to an erratic game that
resulted in missing a chance at establishing a democracy, despite significant advances,
such as the elimination of the very small formal army and of the large number of unoffi-
cial satraps. The last chance of this global conjunction of the 1990s lies in the concep-
tualization of the national policy based on the November 5, 1996 elections. After that it
will be another decade, even another centuryl
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and-such, the green revolution of such-and-such, determines the
reputation, the public image of whether it fits with the demo-
cratic tradition. 1 Up until now this process of re-naming has
been rare. It seems that democratic transitions are difficult, if
not miraculous, given the importance of the necessary combina-
tion of clear-sightedness, determination, and other favorable fac-
tors. In Haiti's case, there needs to be a significant change in
the common perceptions of Haiti. Currently they are all nega-
tive. The democratic transition in Haiti would be all the more
stunning if it also managed to reverse these perceptions. A tacti-
cal short-term victory may have paved the way for democratic le-
gitimacy, but nearly everyone fears a mid-term strategic failure,
particularly because following the elections the international
community will not be inclined to provide the means for a clean
break and an authentic solution to the crisis. This is despite the
threat of the recurring harsh emigration and the obligation of
having to stem the migrations. The eventual success of a demo-
cratic transition in Haiti can only come from a national initiative
to take charge of the overall vision and of the general politics
that would adhere to a "government of poverty" policy capable
of containing the Haitian population. The next step would be to
recommend to Haiti's allies that they modify tactics to help Haiti
down this path, the only one that can possibly succeed.
B. A Poor, Dispossessed, and Beggarly Country? The
Alternative Exists
Haiti is frequently described as a poor and dispossessed
country, with material resources ravaged, and human resources
wasted and illiterate. There is even the reiterated phrase: the
poorest country of the Americas and the only least-developed country of
the continent. Even though it may be difficult to provide any sim-
ple counter-argument to this, two facts undermine the seemingly
irrefutable assertion. The Haitian Diaspora, as an element of
51. We are entering an era that seems to be taking on all the qualities for it to be
called the age of Democracies, just as there existed a prior era called the age of Coloni-
zation or of Independence. This era is proceeding under various signs: 1) at a macro
level, the end of the East/West polarization; 2) at the intermediate level, the end of
military States to contain the crises; and 3) at the micro level, the access to power
through elections of democratic movements. It is there that a democratic reputation
plays a vital role: it establishes itself by day to day advances, through the desire to live
up to its image.
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the country, is an exceptional concentration of human resources
capable of contributing to the life of the country, and the
unique coping mechanisms of poverty, could be used as the im-
petus for Haiti's renewal. These two categories of resources have
been extensively researched and analyzed. There currently ex-
ists a group of proposals and an entire bibliography that could
be used as the foundation of a new, original, and efficient policy.
A poor country?5" Yes, but certainly not as dispossessed as one
might generally think, because the two native keys needed for a
solution to the crisis already exist: the know-how and the human
resources. One must immediately add that the initial percep-
tions of Haiti also include that of a beggarly country held at arms
length. It would be a country incapable of taking control, a
country that will always be begging for alms. It is true. It is also
true that the succession of governments in the post World-War II
era only thought of foreign aid and subsidies, of projects
originating from the outside, and of remittances from the Dias-
pora. In short, there was never any effort to think up ways of
mobilizing local resources. The idea of actually taking control of
the country's fate seemed absurd. Recently, however, it appears
likely that the international political climate will reduce consid-
erably the funds available to countries such as Haiti, and that
sooner or later Haiti will have to attempt to live within its means.
At that point Haiti, by necessity, will have to rely on local abili-
ties, and we will finally have to ask, what is Haiti? It will have to
be debated as external aid will cross the line and become a con-
tribution and not a substitution. The problem is that in the in-
terim, we are witnessing a systematic destruction of the means to
create an authentically local policy. The democratic transition
should determine if it can alter that first group of perceptions by
taking paths other than the traditional routes that have always
led to failure. An alternative exists, as tenuous as it may be.
52. I think that presently the research concerning Haiti should focus on democ-
racy and poverty. The political overexposure Haiti has received in the early 1990s be-
cause its request for democracy should be followed by a concern to expose its poverty to
theoretical debates. It does not seem normal to continue prioritizing the race for exter-
nal aid, and the ensuing contortions for its disbursement, without any attempt of re-
thinking and reconfiguring the problem of one's poverty. See D9MOCRATIE ET
PAuvRETt (J.C. Caillaux & L. Join-Lambert eds., 1991).
DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
C. A Divided and Violent Country, Embattled by Corruption and
Trafficking? The Light at the End of the Tunnel
People claim Haiti is a violent and divided country, with ir-
reconcilable political divisions. The endless, frustrating con-
flicts, however, mask the Haitians' shared democratic ideals. It is
rare to see a country as unified as Haiti, with seventy or even
ninety percent of the population capable of voting for the same
policy. This is because the excluded constitute more than ninety
percent of the population. Haiti is not divided, for the dispos-
sessed are all of the same opinion and aspire to democracy as a
means for establishing political participation, economic growth,
and justice. There is, however, a minority that traditionally has
blocked the democratic and modernization processes. Certain
profiteers have emerged from this wave of democracy and now
claim the right to do as those before them did, as if there had
been no change in the nature of political power. Is Haiti a di-
vided country? Yes, between a very small minority of masters,
never representing more than five percent of the population,
and a multitude of slaves reaching ninety percent, a throwback
to colonial Saint-Domingue on the eve of the Revolution. Is Ha-
iti a divided country? No. When the apartheid is as blatant, the
country can no longer be qualified as a divided one but rather
one whose people are in search of their lost nation. Is Haiti a
violent country? Most certainly, as the direct violence of repres-
sion and the indirect violence of an exclusionary order are
needed to build such an inegalitarian order. Haiti, however, can
be given back to the majority. The urban area of Port-au-Prince
now consists of growths of slums and of brutal occupations pre-
ceding the imminent arrival of more slums where fifty percent of
the Haitian population will soon be living. An already
deplorable situation will be turned into a huge canker surround-
ing the center of Port-au-Prince. More and more, it seems that
only a few principal thoroughfares of Port-au-Prince are worthy
of the civil service's attention. The provinces, which will be the
source of two million more refugees flowing to Port-au-Prince
over the next decade, will be noticed only because of the stub-
born demands of local politicians in the assemblies. In effect,
Haiti is becoming more anarchic and contorted, and the threat
of implosion will grow once the chaos spreads. Only a successful
democratic transition will be able to bring the country back to
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normal by reversing the current trend and dispelling this nega-
tive perception. Is there any hope or future for Haiti? Is there
any hope for a country that has missed every opportunity for de-
mocratization and development, a country regularly pillaged by
every new ruling group, a country that only gets the leaders it
deserves?"3 It is enough to point out that all these assertions are
floating around and would stop in the event of a successful dem-
ocratic transition. The indelible impression left from the series
of events, however, is that the country is running away, and no
one really knows where to. One follows international events and
injunctions, without any desire to deal with them or reorient
them. Will the inability to resort to local knowledge and know-
how finally be exorcised? Can the tradition of obscurantist poli-
cies come to an end? A transition in the process of succeeding
should give this country hopes and plans based on detailed, via-
ble, and realistic policies. Will we someday see the light at the
end of the tunnel? I will conclude this Article by saying that it is
not so much the light that is lacking in this maze but rather that
the end of the tunnel is difficult to reach. So far so good!
53. It is true that steps need to be taken to prevent the plunder of government
coffers. The move toward democracy is in the process of doing so despite rumors to the
contrary. There is also, however, a rigorous eradication that is less obvious to complete,
notably that of corrupt practices and conflicts of interests. In other words, all the illicit
sources of enrichment from which stem so many monopolies, large properties, and
successful businesses. The reputation of a country finally straightened out would make
a large difference.
